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Grant Christensen*
Abstract
The 2010 passage of the Tribal Law and Order Act will invest significantly
more resources in tribal courts. As tribal courts expand, conflicts between
sovereignties - tribal, state, and federal - are likely to occur with much greater
frequency. Tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians will be among the
issues most frequently appealed to federal courts. I offer this piece to propose
a new and novel solution - that tribal courts, through a piecemeal process, be
extended absolute civil jurisdiction over non-Indians for those civil offenses
over which tribes have the greatest interest. This article takes one of the most
common jurisdictional questions - tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians in
cases of trespass to land - and argues that a bright-line rule favoring tribal court
civil jurisdiction in this instance is legally mandated, will pragmatically
conservejudicial resources, and recognizes the broad tribal sovereignty recently
reaffirmed by Congress.
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I. Introduction
As an increasing number of tribes assert their sovereign interests over a
greater sphere ofpolicymaking, assisted by the recent passage ofthe Tribal Law
and Order Act,' the role and importance of tribal courts correspondingly are
subject to even more exacting scrutiny.2 While it has long been established that
1. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258. The bill was
signed into law by the President on July 29,2010. See Remarks by the President Before Signing
the Tribal Law and Order Act, WITE HOUSE (July 29, 2010, 4:58 P.M.), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-tribal-law-and-order-act.
2. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB.
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tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, no such bright-line
rule exists for civil jurisdiction,' making questions of tribal court civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians one of the most litigated issues in Indian law over
the last several decades.'
While the question of whether a tribal court has jurisdiction over a non-
Indian is a federal question6 that supports jurisdiction in federal court,' a non-
L. REV. 121, 140-43, 168 (2006) (arguing that, in the modem age of Indian policymaking,
tribes, rather than Congress or the President, are leading the way in carving out federal Indian
policy, and noting that because tribes are moving faster than the regulatory and legislative
branches, the courts will ultimately become more involved in reviewing the actions of tribal
nations); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law,
32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 391, 436-37 (2007-2008) (arguing that, over the decades, the Supreme
Court has adopted a "formalistic" approach to determining the jurisdictional relationship with
Indians).
3. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,208 (1978) ("[A]n examination of
our earlier precedents satisfies us that, even ignoring treaty provisions and congressional policy,
Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such
power by Congress.").
4. The current state of tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is discussed in Part
III of this article, but begins with a rebuttable presumption against tribal jurisdiction found in
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). For an additional summary of tribal court
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, see Dale Beck Furnish, Sorting Out Civil Jurisdiction in
Indian Country After Plains Commerce Bank: State Courts and the Judicial Sovereignty ofthe
Navajo Nation, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 385 (2008-2009); Max Minzner, Treating Tribes
Differently: Civil Jurisdiction Inside and Outside Indian Country, 6 NEV. L.J. 89 (2005);
Thomas P. Schlosser, Tribal Civil Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers, 37 TULSA L. REV. 573
(2001).
5. The Supreme Court hears on average slightly more than two Indian law cases a year
on topics ranging from water rights, to taxation, to usufructuary rights, to freedom of religion.
Among this diverse set of cases, the Court has been asked directly to confront questions of tribal
civil and regulatoryjurisdiction more than thirty times since the Court first ruled that tribes have
a right "to make their own laws and be ruled by them" in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220,
223 (1959). Recent cases directed at the jurisdiction of tribal courts include Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 554 U.S. 316 (2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353 (2001); Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); and National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471
U.S. 845 (1985).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (conferring federal courts with jurisdiction over "all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
7. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 852-53 (holding that claims alleging that the tribal
court impermissibly overextended its jurisdiction raise a federal question). For a critique of the
decision permitting federal question jurisdiction in National Farmers, see Robert N. Clinton,
Comity & Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Frustration of Tribal-Federal Cooperation, 36
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 30 (2004) [hereinafter Clinton, Comity & Colonialism].
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Indian defendant must exhaust his remedies in a tribal court before contesting
jurisdiction.' Whether those remedies have been exhausted or whether tribal
court civil jurisdiction is so patently inappropriate as not to require exhaustion'
are questions that are increasingly appealed," placing burdens on the very
federal court dockets the exhaustion doctrine is designed to relieve." Even after
the question of exhaustion is settled, and a non-Indian party goes through the
tribal court system and exhausts his final appeal, a federal district court reviews
the tribal court's determination de novo, with no obligation to follow the tribal
court's finding of proper jurisdiction."
Because having stable and predictable forum rules encourages confidence
among all parties and reduces costs associated with litigating such matters,"
tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians ought to be a default and bright-
line rule for particular classes of cases.14 Following the guidance of the
Supreme Court from Montana v. United States and its progeny, the right to
8. See LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 15-16 (holding that exhaustion is required before a federal
court may exercise diversity jurisdiction); National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57 (holding that
exhaustion is required before a federal court may exercise jurisdiction pursuant to a federal
question). For a discussion of the exhaustion requirement, see Phillip Allen White, Comment,
The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine: "Just Stay on the Good Roads, and You've Got Nothing to
Worry About," 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65 (1997).
9. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 369 (quoting National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57; Strate v.
A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459-60, n.14 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(outlining four exceptions to the exhaustion rule: "where an assertion of tribal courtjurisdiction
is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, . . . where the [tribal court] action
is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, .. . where exhaustion would be futile
because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the [tribal] court's jurisdiction, ..
. [or where] it is plain" that tribal court jurisdiction is lacking "so that the exhaustion
requirement would serve no purpose other than delay").
10. See e.g., Strate, 520 U.S. at 448.
11. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57 ("[T]he orderly administration ofjustice in the
federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before
either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed.... Exhaustion of
tribal court remedies, moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise
basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of their
expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review.").
12. Id at 857.
13. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 n.19 (1978) ("The cost of civil
litigation in federal district courts, in many instances located far from the reservations, doubtless
exceeds that in most tribal forums.").
14. Tribal court civil jurisdiction over tribal members is not disputed. WIullAM C. CANBY,
JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 220 (5th ed. 2009) ("[TJhe tribe has exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes between tribal members arising on the reservation.").
[ Vol. 35530
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exclude and the right to jurisdiction over tribal lands are powers part and parcel
with the existence of the tribe itself."
The Court continues to take a case-by-case approach to tribal court civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians.16 This results in uncertainty in the application of
existing rules, encourages appeals on narrow grounds, and wastes judicial
resources. Despite that its reasons for doing so are not necessarily well
founded," the Court, at present, seems reluctant to create a bright-line rule
favoring default tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians."
While there is no current literature arguing for a piecemeal solution -
whereby in certain areas of civil litigation tribal courts are extended full civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians' 9 - such a solution is a compromise that both
tribes and governments could learn to accept.20 As tribal courts exercise their
15. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981) ("[T]he Tribe may prohibit
nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States
in trust for the Tribe.... [I]f the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish or hunt on such lands, it may
condition their entry.") (citation omitted). Although Hicks appeared to undermine this principle
by applying the Montana rule to Indian lands, the Court limited its holding "to the question of
tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law [and left] open the question of
tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general." Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353, 358 n.2 (2001).
16. E.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 374 (holding that the unique facts of the situation justified a
finding that tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over a civil rights claim by a tribal member
against state police officers executing a warrant in Indian Country).
17. For a defense of tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, see Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, The Supreme Court's Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 634 (2008).
18. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-85 (Souter, J., concurring) ("Tribal courts also differ from
other American courts (and often from one another) in their structure, in the substantive law
they apply, and in the independence oftheirjudges. Although some modern tribal courts mirror
American courts and are guided by written codes, rules, procedures, and guidelines, tribal law
is still frequently unwritten, being based instead on the values, mores, and norms of a tribe and
expressed in its customs, traditions, and practices, and is often handed down orally or by
example from one generation to another. The resulting law applicable in tribal courts is a
complex mix of tribal codes and federal, state, and traditional law, which would be unusually
difficult for an outsider to sort out.") (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). For
a discussion of the impact of these misperceptions of tribal law on the Supreme Court, see
Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal
Systems, 37 Aluz. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005).
19. For an argument in favor of judicial deference to federal-tribal agreements regarding
questions including jurisdiction, see Clinton, Comity & Colonialism, supra note 7, at 30.
20. Certainly the ultimate goal is to extend tribal court civil jurisdiction over all persons
and all matters arising within the bounds of the reservation, and to those appropriate and
relevant matters that arise outside the reservation but where the tribe has a sufficient interest.
Unfortunately, Montana and its progeny stand in the way of a spontaneous recognition of a
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growing jurisdictional powers responsibly, Congress, the President, and federal
courts will be more willing to defer to their opinions and further expand the
proper use of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Through incremental growth
in jurisdictional powers, full, absolute, and meaningful tribal sovereignty for
tribal courts gradually may be achieved where it otherwise would be impossible
(politically) to bestow today. The creation of bright-line rules by Congress or
the courts also would save significant costs and improve the efficiency and
coordination of the interaction between federal, state, and tribal courts. With
that in mind, I take the first step - I offer this article to define as absolute tribal
court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in all cases of trespass to real property.
II. The Need for a Bright-Line Rule Favoring Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction
in the Case of Trespass to Real Property
Without clear guidance from the Court or Congress regarding the appropriate
bounds of tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, there are repeated
appeals through the federal court system on increasingly narrow questions of
jurisdiction.2 1 Parties on both sides seek to carve out broad exceptions to tribal
court jurisdiction using narrowly tailored lower court opinions that are often
blanket jurisdictional rule in the tribe's favor. While some will argue that a piecemeal approach
too easily allows the United States to draw lines in the sand to proclaim the boundaries of tribal
court jurisdiction, thereby effectively limiting it, I disagree. Instead, by asserting in small steps
the jurisdictional muscle of the tribal court, tribes can prove that their judiciaries are capable
independently of handling increasingly complex cases. The line in the sand will move forward
until, eventually, the United States will recognize with true parity the jurisdiction of state and
tribal courts. The Tribal Law and Order Act is exceptional proof that all branches of the United
States government can be persuaded to extend the jurisdictional powers of tribal courts. See
supra note I and accompanying text.
21. A quick LEXIS search finds more than three hundred cases from the last decade dealing
directly with the question of tribal court jurisdiction, including three rulings from the Supreme
Court, none of which definitively articulate the jurisdictional boundaries of tribal courts. See,
e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. Inc., 554 U.S. 316, 320 (2008)
(deciding the issue of tribal court jurisdiction for the sale of land by a non-Indian located within
the reservation); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004) (deciding the issue of tribal
courts' criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember hidian); Hicks, 533 U.S. at 355 (2001) (deciding
the issue of tribal court jurisdiction over a non-Indian sheriff executing a state-issued warrant).
Since the beginning of the self-determination era of Indian policy, widely attributed to the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, THOMAS CLARKIN, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN THE
KENNEDY AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS 1961-1969, atxii (2001), or to the Supreme Court's
decision in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
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fact-specific. While neither the Court nor Congress is likely to remedy the
situation by giving either tribal or state courts absolute jurisdiction over non-
Indians, 22 there are a narrow range of issues that conclusively could be decided
in favor of exclusive tribal court civil jurisdiction to definitively settle some of
this litigation. Trespass to real property is an expedient first step because it is
significantly limited to the land the tribe controls, but also significantly will
reduce litigation by eliminating the costly and time-consuming appeals to
federal courts that then consider the jurisdictional questions de novo.
A. A Bright-Line Rule Is Needed to Prevent Trespassers from Severely
Damaging the Reservation
The most recent tribal trespass case to be appealed up to the Supreme Court
is Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court.23 In June of 2002, "Valinda
Jo Elliott, a non-Indian, was riding in a private vehicle ... in the high desert of
Arizona, in an area located within the borders of the White Mountain Apache
Tribe's reservation." 24 She "got lost and [subsequently] ran out of fuel." 25
Elliott proceeded to leave her vehicle and split up from her traveling
companion, wandering alone in the Arizona desert for several days looking for
assistance. 26 "On the third day, she spotted a news helicopter recording [a
distant forest] fire," and "set a small signal fire" of her own "to attract the
helicopter['s] [] attention."" Fortunately, the helicopter saw the signal fire and
rescued Elliott.28 Unfortunately, she failed to extinguish her signal fire and it
"grew into a substantial forest fire," merging with the original. 29  "The
22. The Supreme Court's continued reliance on Montana's default rule against tribal court
jurisdiction, at least on non-Indian fee lands, is evidenced in the Court's most recent related case
to reach the merits stage. Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 330 ("Given Montana's general
proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities
of nonmembers of the tribe, efforts by a tribe to regulate nonmembers, especially on non-Indian
fee land, are presumptively invalid.") (citations omitted) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 565 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. 566 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 624 (2009).
24. Id. at 844.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The existing fire was named the Rodeo fire. The signal fire set by Elliott was named
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combined fire burned more than 400,000 acres of land and caused millions of
dollars in damage." 30
The White Mountain Apache Tribe "brought a civil action against [Elliott]
in tribal court" for violating eight tribal ordinances, including trespass." Elliott
"filed a motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction. The tribal court denied the
motion, holding that it had jurisdiction under the relevant United States
Supreme Court cases." 32 Elliott appealed the tribal court's ruling to the tribal
appellate court. The appellate court dismissed the appeal because it lacked a
procedure to hear interlocutory appeals."
Elliott then filed an appeal in the Federal District Court of Arizona for
dismissal based on lack of tribal jurisdiction." The court dismissed for failure
to exhaust tribal remedies because there was no tribal court decision on the
merits.3 s Citing LaPlante, a unanimous panel in the Ninth Circuit upheld the
ruling, stating that "[a] lthough the Blackfeet Tribal Code establishes a Court of
Appeals, it does not allow interlocutory appeals from jurisdictional rulings.
Accordingly, appellate review of the Tribal Court's jurisdiction can occur only
after a decision on the merits.""
30. Id.
31. Id. at 845. In addition to trespass, the other offenses included "violations of tribal
executive orders, the tribal game and fish code, the tribal natural resources code, and common
law negligence."
32. Id.
33. Id. This is not uncommon. The same set of circumstances existed in Iowa Mutual
Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), where the tribal appellate court concluded that
it lacked jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals. Id. at 17. In that case, the Supreme Court
eventually determined that exhaustion of tribal remedies was not complete, regardless of the
appellate court's ability to hear the petition contesting jurisdiction. Id. at 19. Many tribal courts
have since amended their tribal court appellate jurisdiction to cure the problem. For examples
of tribal court rules amended explicitly to provide interlocutory jurisdiction of tribal appellate
courts, see SOUTHWEST INTERTRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS: RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE,
at 10, available at http://www.ailc-inc.org/PDF%20files/SWITCA%20Appellate
%20Rules.pdf (last visited Apr. 28,2011); FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT, RULE OF PROCEDURE IN
THE COURT OF APPEALS, at 1-2, available athttp://www.fptc.org/appendix/appendix_3.pdf (last
visited Apr. 28, 2011).
34. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (4), (5) and (6), at 1; Elliott
v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, No. CIV 05-04240-PCT-MHM, 2006 WL 1182836
(D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2006).
35. Id. at 7.
36. Elliott, 566 F.3d at 847 (citation omitted) (quoting LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 12). The
Elliott court continues,
The Court in [LaPlante] held that "[t]he federal policy of promoting tribal self-
government encompasses the development of the entire tribal court system,
534 [Vol. 35
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But damages to tribal natural resources and cultural centers are far from the
only ways in which tribes have a significant interest in deterring trespassers
from the reservation. The parade of horribles includes many real dangers that
Indian Country confronts on a daily basis due to trespass upon tribal lands. The
Tohono O'Odham Nation, sitting on the U.S.-Mexican border, faces a constant
barrage of trespassers. These include human and drug traffickers, and the
resultant increased presence of federal law enforcement officials who
inadvertently detain and arrest tribal members they mistake for illegal
immigrants. The tribe now seizes "up to 100,000 pounds of illegal drugs every
year,"37 up from 65,000 pounds just seven years ago, and just 10,000 pounds in
2001. Likewise, more than 2,000 miles from the Mexican border, the
Mohawk Nation in New York and the Blackfeet Nation in Montana have
experienced a steady increase in drug trafficking," in part due to a confusion
over who has the jurisdiction to enforce drug laws in and around the reservation
- the tribe, the state, or the federal government."o
Even worse than drug trafficking is the rapid increase in the cultivation or
manufacture of illegal drugs in Indian Country.4 1 Large tracts of land with
almost no population base leave hundreds of square miles without adequate
police patrols and enforcement.42 Even when the tribe suspects individuals of
illegal drug activity or active involvement in the drug trade, the jurisdiction of
including appellate courts. At a minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies means
that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the determinations
of the lower tribal courts. In this case, the Tribal Court has made an initial
determination that it has jurisdiction over the insurance dispute, but Iowa Mutual
has not yet obtained appellate review, as provided by the Tribal Code.... Until
appellate review is complete, the Blackfeet Tribal Courts have not had a full
opportunity to evaluate the claim and federal courts should not intervene."
Id. (quoting LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 16-17) (alteration in original).
37. LARRY K. GAINES & RODGER LEROY MILLER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ACTION: THE CORE
104 (5th ed. 2008).
38. Kevin Johnson, Drugs Invade Via Indian Land, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 2003, http://
www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-08-06-indian-drugs-usat-x.htm.
39. Diego Marquez, Challenges to Combating Drug Trafficking on Indian Reservations,
20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 549, 549-50 (2006).
40. See id. at 549 (noting this jurisdictional uncertainty as a problem because "without
jurisdiction and access to the lands, local officials are powerless to stop drug trafficking and
other criminal activity").
41. See id. at 550.
42. See Mac McClelland, A Fistful of Dollars, MOTHER JONES, Nov./Dec. 2010, http://
motherjones.com/politics/2010/11/vigilante-justice-oklahoma-indian-reservations (providing
the example of the "Standing Rock Sioux Reservation," which has nine police officers to cover
"an area twice the size of Delaware," creating a significant loophole to enforcement).
No. 2]1 535
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tribal police officers and tribal courts complicates the arrest and prosecution of
guilty parties.4 3 Foreign drug cartels - and even some tribal members - take
advantage of the lack of scrutiny by increasingly moving drug production to the
reservation" - marijuana in the Pacific Northwest4 5 and methamphetamines in
the Great Plains and Mountain West are particularly common.4 6
The drug trade brings with it a marked increase in violence and a dramatic
impact on the health and welfare of the tribe,47 as drug use becomes one of the
largest barriers to economic development.48 But the influence of foreign drug
operations threatens more than just the health of those tribal members who
become addicts. Drug gangs are marrying into the tribes to give themselves a
sense of political legitimacy that threatens to undermine tribal government
directly.49 Particularly among tribes with high levels of unemployment, the
allure of drugs can penetrate the highest levels of tribal government, from elders
and tribal leaders to tribal judges tasked with enforcement of tribal laws.so
43. Marquez, supra note 39, at 549. Unless duly cross-deputized, local law enforcement
officials cannot enforce federal drug laws. Tribes may or may not themselves have drug laws
that would aid in the officers' authority to arrest and the tribes' ability to prosecute, but the
status of the offender as a non-Indian significantly complicates matters. The ability to arrest,
detain, and prosecute non-Indians for trespass on the reservation would give tribal law
enforcement the time and authority necessary to alert federal officials, who could then
investigate further and bring their own charges for violation of the drug laws of the United
States.
44. Sarah Kershaw, Drug Traffickers Find Haven in Shadows oJ Indian Country, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/national/I9smuggle.
html?_r--1 (describing how foreign drug traffickers and even American Indians focus their
supply chains in Indian Country because they believe they are immune from drug laws, or think
that those laws would not be enforced against them).
45. Chapter 5: Disrupt Domestic Drug Trafficking andProduction, 20 10 NATIONALDRUG
CONTROL STRATEGY, at 72, available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/
policy/ndcsl0/chapter5.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
46. Marquez, supra note 39, at 549. C
47. See generally Lisa R. Pruitt, The Forgotten Fifth: Rural Youth and Substance Abuse,
20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 359 (2009) (discussing the increasing abuse of illegal drugs by youth
on reservations, and the impact of the comparatively higher rate of abuse has on rural
communities, including many Indian reservations).
48. Marquez, supra note 39 at 550.
49. Id.; Kershaw, supra note 44.
50. Marquez, supra note 39, at 550 ("[A] tribal court judge was among those arrested in
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B. A Bright-Line Rule Is Needed to Effectuate the Tribes'Right to Exclude
As damaging as the physical effects of trespassers are to tribal governments,
the true sovereignty of a tribe itself is jeopardized when the tribe is unable to
enforce its right to exclude. Tribes are recognized as sovereign governments,"
and one of the most basic tenets of sovereignty is the right to exclude.52
There are no statutory or judicial barriers to a rule granting exclusive
jurisdiction to tribal courts for on-reservation trespass to real property,
regardless of whether the trespasser is an Indian or a non-Indian. In fact, there
is a wealth of recent property literature that supports such a proposition."
Professor Henry E. Smith, one of the leading modern scholars on the law of
property, articulately makes the case for property rules premised upon the right
to exclude. He states that
51. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 206 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter
COHEN] (citing United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 204-05 (2004)) (affirming the Supreme
Court's "traditional understanding" of each tribe as "a distinct political society, separated from
others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself').
52. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (noting that persons are permitted to enter the
Cherokee Nation only "with the assent of the Cherokees themselves"). The United States
signed and ratified the Treaty of Holston (1791), and then subsequently, the Treaty of
Greenville (1795) reaffirmed the Indian right to control their own land and to take action to
prevent others from trespassing upon it.
If any citizen of the United States, or any other white person or persons, shall
presume to settle upon the lands now relinquished by the United States, such
citizen or other person shall be out of the protection of the United States; and the
Indian tribe, on whose land the settlement shall be made, may drive off the settler,
or punish him in such manner as they shall think fit.
Treaty of Greenville art. 6, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49. Professor Henry E. Smith wrote an article
that includes a discussion of exclusion rules based in property rights. See Henry E. Smith,
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1754 (2004) [hereinafter Smith,
Property Rules] (noting that the law of property implies a border around the real property of an
owner, and that great deference to the discretion of the use of that property is given to the lawful
owner, including the right to exclude).
53. E.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360-61 (2001) (discussing the original understanding of real
property as including above all else the inherent right to exclude, and noting that "William
Blackstone, for example, famously defined property as 'that sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe."'). See generally Smith, Property Rules, supra
note 52; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).
No. 2] 537
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
[p]roperty gives the right to exclude from a "thing," good against
everyone else. On the dutyholder side, the message is a simple one
- to "keep out." In this way, the right to exclude simultaneously
protects a reservoir of uses to the owner without officials needing to
know what those might be. 4
While not writing specifically about an Indian tribe's right to exclude others
from its real property," Professor Smith argues convincingly that by affording
the landowner an absolute right to exclude and incentivizing the collection of
information about the land's resources (upon which decisions regarding its use
are premised), the law provides clearly established incentives to maximize the
use of the property.56 In this way, property rules encourage the protection of
real property assets through bright-line rules, allowing the owner of real
property to recover for even nominal damages that arise from a breach of the
owner's absolute interest in the property.57
Professor Smith's preference for property rules based on the right to exclude
applies directly to the construction of jurisdictional rules within reservation
boundaries, particularly for actions that unmistakably implicate the right to
exclude, such as trespass to land. In normative terms, trespass is simply the
breach of an individual's right to exclude.
Trespass to real property is an intentional tort," giving the owner of the land
a right to seek redress whenever an individual commits an act of trespass upon
land to which the owner holds title, "irrespective of whether he thereby causes
harm to any legally protected interest of the other."" Because real property is
by definition immobile, the action can only be brought in the court with
54. Smith, Property Rules, supra note 52, at 1728.
55. Professors Smith and Merrill do discuss the right of a group to exclude from specific
property. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 773, 791-92 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract] ("One
example of exclusion occurs where groups restrict access to resources, such as where a
particular community restricts a fishing ground to members of the community.").
56. Smith, Property Rules, supra note 52, at 1729.
57. See id. at 1723 ("Property rules are prevalent in the law and are by no means
exceptional. Basic actions like trespass protect entitlements by means of injunctions and
punitive damages in the civil law and penalties in the criminal law. If A owns Blackacre and B
enters without A 's consent, A can get an injunction against B and can seek both compensatory
and punitive damages.").
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1965). For a full discussion of the
intentional nature of the civil tort of trespass, see infra Part IV.A.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 158 (1965); Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. (1 Dev.
& Bat.) 371, 371 (N.C. 1835).
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jurisdiction over the situs,o and the only appropriate forum in which the owner
ought to seek this redress is the court where the real property is located."
The right of Indian tribes to exclude individuals from the reservation is not
found solely in theories of property law, but has been ratified by the Supreme
Court.62 In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache, the Supreme Court was asked to
determine the source of a tribe's power to tax." While the majority concluded
that a tribe's power to tax even non-Indians derives from inherent tribal
sovereignty,' the Court also concluded that one of the inherent powers of an
Indian tribe is the power to exclude. The Court stated that
[m]any tribes [] were granted a power unknown to any other
sovereignty in this Nation: a power to exclude nonmembers entirely
from territory reserved for the tribe. Incident to this basic power to
exclude, the tribes exercise limited powers of governance over
nonmembers, though those nonmembers have no voice in tribal
government. Since a tribe may exclude nonmembers entirely from
tribal territory, the tribe necessarily may impose conditions on a
right of entry granted to a nonmember to do business on the
reservation."
If the tribe has the right to exclude even nonmembers from the reservation by
virtue of its inherent sovereignty, as a corollary, it ought to have the right to
regulate the rules for trespass within its borders and to adjudicate disputes
arising under those rules.
Property rules encourage the construction of clear borders and boundaries.
Because local courts are familiar with the geographical metes and bounds of
land within their territory, and because local resources are often necessary to
accurately adjudicate land disputes, the only forum with properjurisdiction over
the trespass claim is that which asserts jurisdiction over the county, state, or
reservation in which the property is located.66
By natural extension, even a non-Indian landowner owning real property
within the reservation should be required seek redress in tribal court for trespass
60. The immobility of real property makes the trespass action "local" as opposed to
"transitory," and therefore, only the court where the property is located can properly hear the
claim. For a full discussion of the local/transitory distinction, see infra Part IV.B.
61. For a discussion of this principle supported by common law, see infra Part IV.B.
62. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 137.
65. Id. at 160.
66. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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by a non-Indian over his real property. Such a rule finds support in the policies
of common law and legislative action. The situs principle - that cases dealing
directly with trespass to real property can only be heard by the sovereign with
jurisdiction over the land - has long found its place in English and American
case law." Congress specifically has delegated to tribal courts jurisdiction over
non-Indians for trespass to real property in cases involving certain classes of
resources,68 and the Supreme Court has approved of jurisdiction over non-
Indians more generally. 69
From a policy perspective, a bright-line rule favoring tribal court civil
jurisdiction over all trespassers is necessary to recognize and effectuate the full
sovereignty of tribal governments. To hold that a sovereign lacks the right to
prosecute a trespasser under its own existing laws designed to protect real
property within its physical boundaries prevents that sovereign from the full
exercise of its inherent rights. The Supreme Court has long recognized the
basic principle that a tribe's inherent sovereignty includes power over not only
its members, but also its territory.o When tens of thousands of acres of tribal
land are destroyed in a fire; when hundreds of thousands of pounds of illegal
drugs are transported across or illicitly grown within the outer bounds of the
reservation; when trespass brings with it violence, disorder, and threats to the
tribes' government and culture. These are times in which the court of the
sovereign with jurisdiction over the land is the only proper venue, as it is the
only authority with local knowledge ofthe land where the trespass occurred and
the concomitant ability to measure the loss inflicted."
Cases like Elliott demonstrate the need for courts and policymakers to extend
the holdings that already inhere in federal statutory and judicial precedent
regarding tribal court civil jurisdiction. The courts should announce a bright-
line rule vesting tribal courts with the sole and exclusive authority over all
persons committing acts of on-reservation trespass to real property.
67. E.g., Doulson v. Matthews, (1792) 100 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144; 4 Term Rep. 503; Rafael
v. Verelst, (1775) 96 Eng. Rep. 579 (W.B.) 581; Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (No.
8,411) (C.C.D. Va. 1811).
68. E.g., American Indian Agricultural Resource Management Act of 1993, 25 U.S.C. §
3713 (2006); National Indian Forest Resources Management Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 3101
(2006).
69. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) ("Tribal courts have
repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes
affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.").
70. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
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III. The Current State of Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction
To understand the necessity of creating a bright-line rule in favor of tribal
court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians for trespass to real property, while
simultaneously recognizing its consonance with the current state of Indian law,
it is first necessary to lay out the current tests for tribal court civil jurisdiction.
The basic rules of civil procedure apply to tribal courts as they do to federal
courts - a tribal court needs both personal jurisdiction over the defendant and
subject matter jurisdiction over the civil action at issue.72
A. Tribal Courts Have Personal Jurisdiction
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)" incorporates a statutory version of
most, but not all,74 of the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights onto tribal
courts, requiring the tribal courts to determine through the relevant due process
provisions whether they have personal jurisdiction over the defendant." The
specific provisions of the ICRA thus require that tribes follow the same basic
test for personal jurisdiction as is applied in federal forums and by federal
courts." The general rule is that the defendant must have "certain minimum
contacts" with the tribe, "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
72. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,453 (1997) (reiterating this requirement from
Montana).
73. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006).
74. Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIz. ST. L.J. 889,
899 n.60 (2003) ("Notable omissions are the guarantee of a republican form of government, the
prohibition against an established religion, the requirement of free counsel for an indigent
accused, the right to a jury trial in civil cases, the provisions broadening the right to vote, and
the prohibitions against denial of the privileges and immunities of citizens.").
75. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any
person of liberty or property without due process of law.").
76. David A. Castleman, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts, 154 U. PA. L.
REv. 1253, 1262 (2001) ("Staying within the four corners of the text of the ICRA itself and
interpreting it using a reasonable subset of the canons of construction require that the Due
Process Clauses of the ICRA and Fourteenth Amendment be read similarly."); Id. at 1255
("Both the text and the legislative history of the ICRA indicate that the ICRA's due process
clause should be interpreted similarly to the Fourteenth Amendment's and in accordance with
the modern conception of personal jurisdiction first announced in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.") (citation omitted).
77. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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Specific personal jurisdiction occurs when there are contacts that give the
tribe an interest and that ensure that the tribal court as a forum is not unduly
inconvenient, and where the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum."" Because of the unique
nature of trespass to real property, a tribal court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a non-Indian is proper because, by entering upon the land, the
individual has purposefully availed himself to the jurisdiction of the court. By
virtue of its undisputed right to exclude," the tribe will always have an interest
in prosecuting non-Indians who unlawfully trespass upon real property within
its reservation because of its interest in protecting its property rights. Because
the trespasser will have "purposefully availed" himself to the jurisdiction of the
tribe by entering the reservation and trespassing upon real property, the tribal
court, by definition, is not an unduly inconvenient forum.
The Supreme Court has never found a tribal court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction to be improper."o The ICRA permits tribes to levy their own
jurisdictional rules and to create self-imposed limitations on personal
jurisdiction." Certainly, if a tribe's legislative and executive branches decided
that the tribe did not want to assert personal jurisdiction over non-Indian civil
trespassers, personal jurisdiction in the tribal court would be improper and
would instead vest in the federal courts through the General Crimes Act.8 2
78. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 344 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
79. E.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) ("[Individuals] have no
right to enter [tribal lands, except] with the assent of the Cherokees themselves.").
80. Cohen notes that "[iut is conceivable, although unlikely, that a tribal court could have
subject matter jurisdiction over a case but lack personal jurisdiction over the defendant."
COHEN, supra note 51, at 605 (citation omitted). An example of such a circumstance could exist
where "a non-Indian defendant's conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe and thus fits within the
second Montana exception establishing subject matter jurisdiction, while the tribal court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant because that conduct occurred outside the tribal
territory such that the defendant lacks minimum contacts with the forum sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction over her." Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Specific personal jurisdiction exists where "the defendant has purposefully directed his
activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out
of or relate to those activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because trespass is conduct "purposely
directed" at the "residents of the forum," the tribal court could properly assert personal
jurisdiction over a non-Indian trespasser.
81. See COHEN, supra note 51, at 604.
82. The General Crimes Act, also known as the Indian Country Crimes Act, permits the
extension of federal enclave laws to the reservation to be enforced by the federal government.
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Moreover, even in instances like Plains Commerce, where the Supreme Court
found the assertion of tribal court subject matter jurisdiction improper when
questions of fee title ownership were raised, the issue of whether personal
jurisdiction was proper was never litigated. But because the property at issue
was located on the reservation, the tribe had personal jurisdiction over the non-
Indian-owned bank located off the reservation.
A bright-line rule establishing tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
for trespass to real property does not extend tribal court personal jurisdiction
any further than already exists by law. Under this rule, de novo review is
replaced with absolute deference to tribal courts to determine their own
jurisdiction in trespass cases. Dispensing with the time-consuming and costly
appeals process will improve the efficiency of the judiciary and conserve
valuable resources for both federal and tribal court systems.
B. Tribal Courts Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court rewrote the rules regarding tribal
court civil jurisdiction with its pronouncement in Montana v. United States.5
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of
the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the
Indian country."). Under the General Crimes Act, the federal government always has
concurrent jurisdiction to bring charges in federal court for criminal trespass. It can also use
the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006), to bring civil trespass charges against non-
Indian trespassers so long as the state in which the reservation is located also permits recovery
for civil trespass.
83. 554 U.S. 316, 341 (2008).
84. To extend jurisdiction over a party to litigation, the defendant must have "certain
minimum contacts with [the forum jurisdiction] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such contacts exist when an
individual "has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum," Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted), or has
intentionally harmed a resident therein, Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). As a
practical matter, an individual whose conduct "threatens or directly affects tribal interests within
the meaning of Montana's second exception, is very likely to have minimum contacts with the
forum sufficient to justify the tribal court's personal jurisdiction." COHEN, supra note 51, at 605
(citation omitted).
85. Montana is one of the most important Indian law decisions issued by the Supreme
Court. It dealt with a range of issues, from the ownership of the real property below a river, to
the property interests given to a state upon entering the union, to the authority of tribal courts
to pass and enforce laws or regulations affecting the activities of non-Indians on non-Indian fee
land within the reservation. It is discussed in detail in Part III of this article. For other
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The relevant provisions of Montana focused on whether the Crow Tribe of
Montana could "regulate hunting and fishing" on land owned by non-Indians
within its reservation." The Court clarified that there are two factors relevant
in determining whether a tribal court has subject matter jurisdiction - whether
the defendant is an Indian, and the status of the land where the unlawful action
occurs.87
Ifthe defendant is an Indian and the action occurs within "Indian Country,""
then "[t]here is no general federal statute limiting tribal jurisdiction over tribal
members."8 The Supreme Court has recognized that subject matterjurisdiction
over tribal members is first and foremost a matter for the tribe to determine.o
discussions of Montana, see Judith V. Royster, Montana at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV.
631 (2006); Paul A. Banker & Christopher Grgurich, The Plains Commerce Bank Decision and
Its Further Narrowing ofthe Montana Exceptions as Applied to Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over
Non-Member Defendants, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 565 (2010).
86. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981). Contrary to the commonsense
perspective that all land within a reservation is owned by the federal government for the benefit
of tribes (held in trust), much of this land was parceled out and sold to non-Indians under the
Dawes Act. This Act resulted in non-Indians owning land in fee on the reservation, further
complicating the jurisdictional questions presented to tribal courts. For a discussion of the
Dawes Act, see Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995); Richard
A. Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country: The Double-Edged Sword of the
Trust Relationship and Trust Responsibility Arising Out ofEarly Supreme Court Opinions and
the General Allotment Act, 25 N.M. L. REv. 35 (1995); Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling
Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth ofCommon Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559
(2001).
87. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
88. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151 provides a federal definition for "Indian Country," defining it
as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original
or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006). It is located in the criminal chapter of the United States Code
(Chapter 18) rather than in the chapter on Indians (Chapter 25) because it sets the jurisdictional
boundaries for the Major Crimes Act, providing for federal criminal jurisdiction over certain
crimes committed by Indians in Indian Country. Id. § 1153.
89. COHEN, supra note 51, at 599.
90. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 389 (1976) ("Since the adoption
proceeding is appropriately characterized as litigation arising on the Indian reservation, the
jurisdiction of the Tribal Court is exclusive.").
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Where the tribe provides for subject matter jurisdiction over its members and
the conduct occurs between members on the reservation, there is no question
as to the appropriateness of tribal jurisdiction."
For non-Indians, the question of the tribal courts' subject matterjurisdiction
is significantly more complicated and "must be read in light of the subsequent
alienation of those lands."92 Regarding most instances of on-reservation
trespass, this presents no problem. When the conduct of a non-Indian occurs
on Indian land (i.e. land that is held in trust by the federal government on behalf
of the tribe, held in fee by the tribe itself, or held in fee by a tribal member),
there is a presumption that the tribal court has subject matter jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court has long recognized that tribes have an interest in
asserting both regulatory and adjudicatory authority over the conduct of all
persons who enter tribal land,94 and has clarified that so long as the tribe has the
ability to regulate the conduct, its tribal courts have exclusive adjudicatory
authority over the nonmember." That "[c]ivil jurisdiction over [non-Indians on
91. There are instances where tribal court subject matter jurisdiction may extend to off-
reservation conduct by tribal members, as when that conduct involves the exercise of off-
reservation treaty rights like hunting and fishing. See United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816,
819 (9th Cir. 1985); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 239 (9th Cir. 1974). But the very nature
of trespass involves an action contemplated over territory specifically within the confines ofthe
reservation.
92. Montana, 450 U.S. at 560.
93. Id. at 564-65.
94. This interest was at one time absolute. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561
(1832) ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or
in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress."). But the Court has recently found
limited instances where public policy reasons preempt tribal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
95. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 440 (1997); see also id. at 452-53 (quoting
Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976)) ("[S]tate courts may not exercise jurisdiction
over disputes arising out of on-reservation conduct - even over matters involving non-Indians
- if doing so would 'infring[e] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them."'); id. at 453 (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,
480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987)) ("[W]here tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of
nonmembers, '[c] ivil jurisdiction over [disputes arising out of] such activities presumptively lies
in the tribal courts."'); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (citing Fisher
v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Exparte Crow Dog,
109 U.S. 556 (1883)) (noting that "[tiribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as
appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and
property interests of both Indians and non-Indians" when those rights are connected directly to
the land itself).
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reservation lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively
limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute" has been routinely
reaffirmed by the federal courts." The unique nature of trespass to real
property ensures that almost all cases of non-Indian trespass where the tribe has
an interest in prosecuting will occur on Indian land, and thus present no real
problem to tribal court subject matter jurisdiction.
There remain a very small number of relevant cases where non-Indians could
commit acts of civil trespass upon non-Indian fee land within the reservation.97
When the conduct occurs on non-Indian fee land, the presumption in favor of
tribal court subject matter jurisdiction is reversed.98 But the presumption is
rebuttable in two instances:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means,
the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-
Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."
These two exceptions, often referred to as the first and second Montana
exceptions"o or the consensual relations and direct effects tests,' identify the
96. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n. 14 (1982) ("Because the Tribe retains all inherent attributes
of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference
from silence . . . is that the sovereign power . . . remains intact."); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) ("[A] proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for
the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of
clear indications of legislative intent.").
97. The likelihood of this occurring depends heavily upon the nature of the reservation
itself For tribes with reservations that were never subject to allotment and where the United
States therefore holds title to the entirety of the reservation for the benefit of the tribe, the
situation described is an absolute impossibility. The more land within the reservation that has
been subject to allotment, the more likely the situation becomes. For a full discussion of
allotment, see Royster, supra note 86; Monette, supra note 86; Bobroff, supra note 86.
98. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) ("[The] exercise of tribal
power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations
is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation.").
99. Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
100. Nord v. Kelly, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (D. Minn. 2007); see also Skibine, supra
note 2, at 412; Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court's Divestment and
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outer bounds of tribal court subject matter jurisdiction over non-Indians. To
overcome the presumption against tribal court subject matter jurisdiction,
Montana requires only that one of its exceptions be met.102
Even with an initial presumption against tribal court jurisdiction for acts of
trespass to real property by a non-Indian on non-Indian fee land, the
presumption is rebutted by the second Montana exception. The second
Montana exception rebuts the presumption against tribal court subject matter
jurisdiction when "that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe."l03 The Supreme Court has recognized that the tribe "may quite
legitimately seek to protect its members from noxious uses that threaten tribal
welfare or security, or from nonmember conduct on the land that does the
same."'" A tribal trespass statute is a legitimate regulation to protect the tribe
and its members from such "noxious" activity on non-Indian fee land within the
reservation that could spread and impact the tribe and its members directly.
Trespassers can set fires, grow drugs, or damage infrastructure' - all of which
"directly [a]ffect [both] the political integrity [and] the economic security. . .
of the tribe."' 06 These specters are far from an improbable parade of horribles;
some have already occurred.'07
Although no case has yet contested whether the tribal courts have the ability
to adjudicate civil trespass claims against non-Indians for trespass on non-
Indian fee land within the reservation,0o the tribes' interest in passing such a
Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 147, 160-62, 169 (2000).
101. Melissa L. Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary: Challenges Facing Tribal Governments
in Implementing the Full Faith and Credit Provisions ofthe Violence Against Women Acts, 90
KY. L.J. 123 passim (2002).
102. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
103. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
104. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 336.
105. For a discussion of potential damage caused by trespassers upon the reservation and
examples of such damage, see supra Part II.A.
106. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. Discussion of these events is provided in much greater
detail in Part II, including the case of Valinda Jo Elliott, who set a fire that destroyed significant
forest resources of the White Mountain Apache Nation, as well as drug traffickers who
transport, cultivate, and manufacture drugs in Indian Country. These parties pose threats to the
reservation, to individual tribal members, and to the tribe as a political institution. See generally
Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 624 (2009); Kershaw, supra note 44; Marquez, supra note 39, at 549-50.
107. See e.g., Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2009);
Marquez, supra note 39; Kershaw, supra note 44.
108. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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regulation relates to their "political integrity" and "economic security." While
a tribal court may not have the inherent and exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate
other torts occurring between non-Indians on non-Indian fee land, such as
assault or unlawful detention, the nature and importance of land to the tribes
makes trespass fundamentally different, and the tribes' interest significantly
more compelling.o 9
The second Montana exception clearly contemplates tribal court civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians under any number of its allowable exceptions.
The tribe's "welfare" is better served because tribal police need not concern
themselves with whether the offending invader is on tribal land or non-Indian
fee land. Instead, the officers can focus on enforcing the trespass ordinance.
The "economic security" prong is easily satisfied, as trespassers can cause
significant damage to the reservation. Fires or activities that pollute non-Indian
fee land within the reservation threaten the "health" and "welfare" of the tribe.
The inability of the tribal court to control trespassers from committing unlawful
acts within the reservation threatens the "political integrity" of the tribe.
Extending tribal civil jurisdiction to trespass claims touches upon every area of
concern articulated in the second Montana exception, clearly rebutting the
presumption against tribal court jurisdiction.
C. Tribal Courts Should Have Exclusive Jurisdiction Over On-Reservation
Trespasses
Unless the tribe takes affirmative steps to limit its personal jurisdiction, a
trespasser entering the reservation subjects herself to the tribal court's personal
jurisdiction. Moreover, the unique nature of trespass to real property ensures
that most claims are brought in tribal court when the trespass occurs on Indian-
owned land or when the trespasser is herself a tribal member, presenting no
barrier to tribal court subject matter jurisdiction." In the rare case where a
non-Indian brings a trespass action against another non-Indian, the tribal court
still has subject matter jurisdiction. This is because, in every instance, the
rebuttable presumption against tribal court subject matterjurisdiction over non-
Indians for trespasses occurring on non-Indian fee land within the reservation
will be rebutted by the second Montana exception. Accordingly, a bright-line
rule that vests exclusive civil jurisdiction to the tribal courts over non-Indians
109. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982) (explaining that
"[n]onmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to the tribe's power to exclude
them... [which] includes the lesser power to place conditions on entry, on continued presence,
or on reservation conduct").
110. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
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in the case of trespass to real property codifies the existing law while reducing
the ultimately fruitless appeals that arise from challenges to tribal court
jurisdiction over civil trespass actions.
IV Justifications for Creating a Bright-Line Rule in Favor of Tribal Court
Civil Jurisdiction
Having established that a bright-line rule favoring tribal court civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians for trespass to real property saves time and
resources without significantly changing the existing tests and presumptions,
it is now only a matter of justifying the legal foundation for such a rule. This
section first identifies what constitutes trespass to real property. It then
demonstrates that the justification for the bright-line rule is supported by both
common law and congressional intent.
A. Trespass Is an Intentional Tort
The common law tort of trespass to real property occurs "when a person,
without authority or privilege, physically invades or unlawfully enters the
private premises of another whereby damages directly ensue.""' Under the
common law, trespass to property or unlawful entry to land is an intentional tort
- a mere unconsented entry is enough prevail on a claim.112 The amount of
damage is inconsequential, as damage is implied by the trespass itself under the
common law."' For example, a surveyor who mistakenly enters land he does
not know belongs to another is liable for nominal damages to the owner of the
land even if no physical property is destroyed." 4 Damages for trespass are
111. United States v. Operation Rescue, 112 F. Supp. 2d. 696, 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
(quoting Apel v. Katz, 697 N.E.2d 600, 607 (Ohio 1998)); see also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The gist of a claim for
trespass on land is the wrongful interference with one's possessory rights in property.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1965) ("One who intentionally enters land in the
possession of another is subject to liability to the possessor for a trespass, although his presence
on the land causes no harm to the land, its possessor, or to any thing or person in whose security
the possessor has a legally protected interest.").
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 158 (1965) ("One is subject to liability to another
for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of
the other, if he intentionally (a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or
a third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing
which he is under a duty to remove.").
113. Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 371, 371 (N.C. 1835).
114. Id.; see also Smith, Property Rules, supra note 52, at 1719, 1754-74 (discussing
"property rules and owners' rights to exclude others from their property").
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similarly appropriate for invading the airspace over the property of another"'
or where the actions of an individual induce others to trespass upon another's
real property."6  The trespassing entity need not even be human.' For
example, suppose "A intentionally drives a stray horse from his pasture into the
pasture of his neighbor, B. A is a trespasser.""' Similarly, suppose "A, on a
public lake, intentionally discharges his shotgun over a point of land in B's
possession, near the surface. The shot falls into the water on the other side. A
is a trespasser."' 9
A successful civil trespass claim need not allege significant financial injury.
Because trespass is an intentional tort, mere entry to the land is sufficient.'20
The amount of damages may depend upon the acts perpetrated by the trespasser
to the land and the extent of injury therefrom, "[b]ut it is an elementary
principle, that every unauthorised [sic], and therefore unlawful entry, into the
close of another, is a trespass,"' 2 ' and "[a]lthough proof of a negligent act may
be sufficient to support a civil action for trespass, such proof is not a necessary
element."'' 2 2
115. Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93, 95 (Iowa 1902) (holding that a trespass occurs
where a defendant reaches her arm across a boundary fence).
116. Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. 1822) (holding a balloonist liable in trespass for
all damage to vegetables incurred by a crowd pursuing the balloon).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
118. Id. § 158 cmt. i, illus. 4.
119. Id. § 158 cmt. i, illus. 6; see also Whittakerv. Stangvick, 111 N.W. 295 (Minn. 1907)
(holding that the shooting of guns over another's land is a wrong for which an injunction is
available).
120. In re Bundick, 303 B.R. 90, 114 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) ("Civil liability for trespass
may be predicated upon unintentional trespass. Liability may also be imposed for actions done
accidentally, inadvertently or by mistake. Although proof of a negligent act may be sufficient
to support a civil action for trespass, such proof is not a necessary element.") (citations
omitted).; Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 745 F. Supp. 446, 456 (S.D. Ohio 1990) ("[E]very
unauthorized entry upon the land of another constitutes a trespass and regardless of whether the
owner suffered substantial injury or not, he at least sustains a legal injury which entitles the
owner to a verdict for some damages. The law of Ohio conclusively presumes damages in
every case of trespass.") (citation omitted).
121. Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 371, 371 (N.C. 1835); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1965); see also Dougherty, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) at 371 ("From
every such entry against the will of the possessor, the law infers some damage; if nothing more,
the treading down the grass or the herbage."); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 745 F. Supp. 446, 456
(S.D. Ohio 1990), affd, 947 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1991) ("The law .. .presumes damages in every
case of trespass.").
122. Bundick, 303 B.R. at 114 ("Civil liability for trespass may be predicated upon
unintentional trespass. Liability may also be imposed for actions done accidentally,
inadvertently or by mistake. Although proof of a negligent act may be sufficient to support a
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The tort of civil trespass to real property originated with the common law,123
and from its common law roots emerged a consensus on where venue for civil
trespass claims is proper.124 Whether decided under federal common law, 125
statutes enacted by tribal councils,126 or tribal customary law,12 7 trespass to real
property is a prosecutable offense. A federal court reviewing the assertion of
tribal court civil jurisdiction for trespass to real property will note that, under
the common law, the tribal court is the only venue that can properly assert
jurisdiction, 12 and under federal Indian law, the tribe has the inherent power to
exclude persons without a specific grant from the federal government or the
landowner.'2 9
civil action for trespass, such proof is not a necessary element.") (citations omitted).
123. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 18 (2010); see also Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng.
Rep. 1021, 1022, 1025; 1 Cowp. 161, 161, 165.
124. Trespass claims under the common law were separated into those which were local and
those which were transitory in nature. Doulson v. Matthews, (1792) 100 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1145;
4 Term Rep. 503, 504. Even after the distinction between local and transitory actions was
muted by subsequent opinions, the distinction was maintained for trespass to real property
claims. British S. Afr. Co. v. Companhia De Mocambique, [1893] A.C. 602, 631. For a
discussion of the history of civil trespass to real property under the common law, see
Jurisdiction-Trespass to Real Property-Local Action, 20 MICH. L. REV. 913, 913-14 (1921-
1922).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1965).
126. Many tribes have constitutions that vest legislative powers in a tribal council. These
councils vary widely in size and delegated powers. Unless otherwise prohibited by
constitutional limitations, tribal councils may specifically codify a civil code that includes
trespass to real property and is applicable to all persons over whom they have legislative
authority. See generally COHEN, supra note 51, at 260-62, 276-78 (citations omitted). A
collection of tribal codes can be found at Tribal Law & Policy Inst., TribalLaws/Codes, TRIBAL
CT. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/codes.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2011),
and Native Am. Rights Fund, Tribal Code & Constitution Directory - the A-ZList, NATIVE AM.
RTs. FUND, http://www.narf.org/nill/triballaw/az.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
127. Even if there is not a codified civil code that includes trespass, tribal courts may rely
on tribal customary law or tribal common law to prosecute the offense. See Robert D. Cooter
& Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role ofCustom in American Indian Tribal
Courts, 46 AM. J. COmp. L. 509, 529-530 (1998). For a general discussion on the use of tribal
customary law, see RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAw: A
TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE (2009); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking
Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57 (2007).
128. See infra note 168 (discussing Doulson v. Matthews, (1792) 100 Eng. Rep. 1143; 4
Term Rep. 503).
129. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (permitting persons to enter
the Cherokee reservation only "with the assent of the Cherokees themselves"); Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982).
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B. The Common Law Supports Exclusive Tribal Court Jurisdiction
Under the common law, trespass actions involving real property were
divided into two categories: "transitory" and "local."' Following common law
principles of evidence and civil procedure, the nature ofthe trespass determined
where venue was properly laid.'"' The United States Supreme Court has ratified
the distinction between "transitory" and "local" trespass as binding on modem
American courts,132 and thus has given effect or sanctioned these rules as
guiding civil trespass jurisdiction today.'33
A transitory trespass involves a personal injury (trespass to the person) 34 or
the destruction of goods (trespass to chattel).'3 1 Under established common
law, in a transitory trespass, "it is only necessary to lay a venue for a place of
trial, and . .. such venue is good without stating where the trespass was in fact
committed." 3 6 The named venue need only be "with[in] a scilicet ofthe county
in which the action is brought."' 3 ' The justification for the rule of transitory
130. Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 107 (1895), superseded by statute,
Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089; Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S.
66,67 (1880), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089; McKennav. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241,248 (1843), superseded by statute, Judicial
Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089; Doulson, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1145;
4 Term Rep. at 504.
131. Ellenwood, 158 U.S. at 107-08; Casey, 102 U.S. at67-68; McKenna, 42 U.S. at 247-48;
Doulson, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1144; 4 Term Rep. at 503.
132. Ellenwood, 158 U.S. at 107-08 ("An action for trespass upon land, like an action to
recover the title or the possession of the land itself, is a local action, and can only be brought
within the state in which the land lies."); McKenna, 42 U.S. at 248 ("In transitory actions a
venue is only necessary to be laid to give a place for trial. Such a venue is indispensable, for
without it would not appear in what county the trial was to take place, nor could a jury be
summoned to try the issue.").
133. Hayes v. Gulf Oil Corp., 821 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that civil suits
deemed local in nature must "be brought within the territorial boundaries of the state where the
land is located"); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. E. Coast Yacht Sales, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 19, 20
(E.D. Pa. 1991); Minichiello Realty Assocs. v. Britt, 460 F. Supp. 896, 898 (D.N.J. 1978), affd,
605 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1979).
134. See Dennickv. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 11, 11, 18 (1881) (holding that, where the derailing
of a railroad car killed a man, his widow may bring an action for trespass to the person against
the railroad in any venue because trespass to the person is a transitory offense).
135. See McKenna, 42 U.S. at 242-43, 249 (holding that trespass to chattel, including
liquors, coffee, tea, and clothing, was a transitory offense and venue for the trespass could be
fixed anywhere within "a scilicet of the county").
136. Id. at 249.
137. Id.; see also id. at 248 ("[A]s to transitory actions, there is not a colour [sic] of doubt
but that any action which is transitory may be laid in any county in England, though the matter
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trespass is simple. Because any court is capable of adjudicating the elements
of an offense involving personal injury or injury to chattel, venue is only
necessary to give all parties notice that the trial for the offense has been vested
in a court, thus effectuating orderly justice.'
Unlike a transitory trespass, a local trespass involves a trespass to real
property. The trespass is the unlawful entry itself and damages to the land
sustained as a result.'39 Venue for a local trespass "cannot be changed into any
other county than where the trespass to the realty was done, and never can be
carried out of the sovereignty in which the land is." 1 40 The common law
justification restricts the proper venue for trespass to land to the sovereign that
controls the land. 14 1
A different justification is used here than in cases of transitory trespass
because the injured thing (in this case the land) is not portable. While anyjudge
orjuror may be presented with physical evidence of bodily injury and damaged
chattel, real property can never enter the courtroom.142 The rule relies upon the
logical premise that trespass to real property properly can be adjudicated only
by the sovereign and by the court in the best position to know the nature and
character of the land itself.143 The familiarity of the court and its jurors with the
land in question places it in the best position properly to assess injury and award
damages.
1. Application ofEnglish Common Law of Trespass in the United States
"The distinction between local actions and transitory actions finds its
American roots in Livingston v. Jefferson."" Livingston "arose during the
presidency of Thomas Jefferson, when United States marshals, acting on
President Jefferson's instructions, forcibly ejected Edward Livingston, a
arises beyond the seas.").
138. See id. at 247-48 (discussing venue in transitory trespass cases as a legal fiction merely
providing a place for trial).
139. Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 108 (1895), superseded by statute,
Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089; 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass
§ 18 (2010).
140. McKenna, 42 U.S. at 247-48.
141. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892); McKenna, 42 U.S. at 249
(dismissing the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District of Colombia over a local
trespass claim because the alleged trespass occurred in Maryland); Trust Co. Bank v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 950 F.2d 1144, 1148-49 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the transitory/local
distinction is well ingrained in the legal rules of the United States).
142. McKenna, 42 U.S. at 248.
143. See id.
144. Box v. Ameritrust Texas, N.A., 810 F. Supp. 776, 778 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
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Louisiana landowner, from land along the Mississippi River in New
Orleans."'4 5 Alleging trespass to land, "Livingston sued the by-then former
president in a federal court in Virginia."l4 A distinguished panel, including
Chief Justice John Marshall and John Tyler, dismissed the action.147 Chief
Justice Marshall wrote that "actions are deemed transitory, where transactions
on which they are founded, might have taken place anywhere; but are local
where their cause is in its nature necessarily local."1 48 Accordingly, Marshall
found that an action for trespass to land in Louisiana was local, and could not
be heard in a Virginia court, as venue was appropriate only in Louisiana. 14 By
adopting the legal distinction between actions that are local and actions that are
transitory in nature, the court reaffirmed the principles of property and trespass
law from Great Britain, and adopted them firmly as solid legal principles upon
which the courts of the United States would rely.'
Three decades later, the issue of jurisdiction for a local trespass action was
decided by the United States Supreme Court."' In McKenna v. Fisk, the
defendant broke into an owner's store in Maryland and stole or destroyed
merchandise valued at $2,000. 152 The plaintiffbrought suit in the District Court
for the District of Columbia on three counts, two of which dealt with damages
to property deemed "transitory," and one for an unlawful entry deemed
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Chief Justice Marshall participated in Livingston as part of his circuit-riding
responsibility with the Supreme Court. For more information on circuit riding in general and
Chief Justice Marshall's circuit responsibilities in particular, see generally HERBERT A.
JOHNSON,THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1835, at 112-37 (1997). John
Tyler is the father of future tenth President of the United States John Tyler. Tyler, John, in 10
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 87-88 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936). He was appointed
to his seat on the District Court for the District of Virginia on January 2, 1811, by President
Madison. Biographical Directory ofFederal Judges: Tyler, John, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://
www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=:2429&cid=:999&ctype==na&instate==na (last visited May
1,2011).
148. Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at 664.
149. Id. at 661, 665. The importance of the local/transitory distinction for trespass is so
strong that it is given deference even when the alleged trespasser may never again be found
within the borders of the jurisdiction of a court that may be able to try him for the offense. See
id. at 665.
150. Id. at 662 ("[T]he action for trespass, quare clausumfregit, still remained local, and is
so held to this day.... [I]t being a local action, it ought to have been instituted in the district
where the trespass was committed.").
151. McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241 (1843), superseded by statute, Judicial
Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. 10 1-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
152. Id. at 242-44.
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"local."' 53 The District Court of the District of Columbia refused to admit
evidence from witnesses who were citizens of Maryland because it considered
them outside the jurisdiction of the court.'54 The Supreme Court reversed the
district court and remanded to permit the owner to present evidence on the
counts that were transitory in nature because venue over transitory matters need
not rest exclusively with the county where the property was injured.' The
District Court for the District of Columbia thus had properjurisdiction over the
transitory claims.5 ' The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the district court's
decision with regard to the local trespass count because suit was vested in an
improper venue.'" Venue was proper only for the local trespass action only in
the District Court of Maryland.1 8
Since the Livingston and McKenna decisions, "the common law local action
doctrine has become ingrained in American jurisprudence, with state and
federal courts alike recognizing and applying the rule."' 59 As recently as 1997,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the local/transitory distinction as
good law.' 60 Today, it stands that an "action involving real property, as
153. Id. at 246.
154. Id. at 244.
155. See id. at 247-49. The witnesses could come from any place. So long as they could
testify to the amount and quality of the goods, their testimony was admissible in any court. The
court could then make a determination whether the value of the goods was indeed worth the
amount claimed in the suit. Because persons everywhere are familiar with the kinds of chattels
destroyed, there was no reason to limit the jurisdiction of the court or proscribe the citizenship
of eligible witnesses in a transitory claim. See id at 248.
156. Id. at 249. Any court that could obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant would
have jurisdiction over the transitory claims because, by its very nature, it was only necessary
that all parties agree that there be one place, time, judge, etc. to hear the matter and issue a final
decision that would be afforded full faith and credit in all other U.S. courts. Id. at 248.
157. Id. at 247.
158. See id.
159. Box v. Ameritrust Texas, N.A., 810 F. Supp. 776, 778 (E.D. Tex. 1992); see also, e.g.,
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 234 U.S. 369,372-73 (1914); In reNew
York Trap Rock Corp., 158 B.R. 574, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (permitting venue "in a judicial
district in which a substantial part of the events of omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,
or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated").
160. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,907 (1997) (holding that common law announced
by the courts in the United States often stems from the decisions of foreign courts and citing
with approval McKenna local-transitory distinction as an example of American law taken from
abroad); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 454, 469 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing McKenna
for the proposition that the jurisdictional rules for transitory actions apply in diversity cases in
federal courts the same way they apply in state courts between citizens).
No. 2] 555
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
opposed to a transitory action, must be brought within the territorial boundaries
of the state in which the land is located.""'6
What was true in the time of President Jefferson is still the law in the United
States today.162 Although some states have questioned the local/transitory
distinction,1 3 it remains the undisputed principle for resolving jurisdictional
conflicts for civil trespass cases in federal courts."*
In the United States, trespass actions filed under in personam jurisdiction
also follow this rule.6 s For example, in 2000, the district court in Hallaba
found that Worldcom's laying of fiber-optic cable across defendant landowner's
real property without permission was a trespass to land.'16  The defendant's
three other claims also derived from the alleged unlawful use of the land.'6 1 In
reiterating the local/transitory distinction and reinforcing Livingston's principle
that civil trespass cases must be brought in a court with jurisdiction over the
land, the district court confirmed that the local/transitory rule for trespass to real
property cases is alive and well.
161. Trust Co. Bank v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 950 F.2d 1144, 1148 (5th Cir. 1992); Hayes v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 821 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1987) ("A local action involving real property can
only be brought within the territorial boundaries of the state where the land is located."); see
also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Kingsborough v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 24, 31-32 (D. Mass
2009) ("[T]he local action doctrine 'now is established firmly in federal jurisprudence and the
case law makes it as clear as anything can be that this distinction exists and that local actions
can be brought only where the property involved in the action is located."') (citations omitted);
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440,449-50 (2d Cir. 2000); Trust Co. Bank, 950 F.2d at 1148;
Raphael J. Musicus, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 743 F.2d 503, 506-07 (7th Cir. 1984); Van
Beek v. Ninkov, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Hallaba v. WorldcomNetwork
Servs., 196 F.R.D. 630, 647 (N.D. Okla. 2000).
163. For a list of states that have questioned the transitory/local distintion, including
Louisiana, Arkansas, Minnesota, Missouri, and New Hampshire, see RaphaelJ Musicus, Inc.,
743 F.2d at 510.
164. See e.g., id. at 506 ("Proper venue is determined by the characterization of the action
as either local or transitory."); Bailey v. Shell W. E&P, Inc., 609 F.3d 710, 721 (5th Cir. 2010);
Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051, 1058 (3d. Cir. 1982); Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476
F.3d 887, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 110.20[2] (Matthew Bender ed., 3d ed. 2002) ("[T]o provide in rem relief, the court must have
jurisdiction over the real property at issue, and a local action must therefore be brought in the
jurisdiction in which that real property is located.").
165. See, e.g., Hallaba, 196 F.R.D. at 646-47.
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2. The Common Law as Applied to Federal Indian Law
McKenna cites with approval Doulson v. Matthews,' in which the English
courts concluded that they lacked jurisdiction over a claim of trespass in
Canada (then a colony) because quare clausumfregit (trespass) is a local and
not a transitory matter." In McKenna, Justice Wayne cited Rafael v. Verelst
for the proposition that "the jurisdiction of crimes is local. And so as to the
rights of real property, the subject being fixed and immovable."' The
language of McKenna contemplates that jurisdiction over a trespass claim rests
solely with the "sovereignty in which the land" lies."'
Other British rulings reinforce the proposition that jurisdiction properly
could be found only in the courts of the country where the land is situated."'
In British South Africa Co. v. Companhia De Mocambique, the Queen's Bench
division determined that, for purposes ofjurisdiction over land, "[n]o nation can
execute its judgments. . .against ... real property in the country of another.""'
Finding that "the laws of the country where [the land] is situated" should
govern,174 the court deferred to the law of South Africa, held its own jurisdiction
168. In Doulson, Matthews allegedly entered the house of the plaintiff in Canada,
"expell[ed] him" from his home, and commandeered his possessions. Doulson v. Matthews,
(1792) 100 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144; 4 Term Rep. 503. Doulson brought suit in the courts of
England. At trial, Lord Kenyon concluded that, because there was no proof offered in England
that Doulson's tangible personal property was taken, the transitory action was without a well-
pled cause. Id. The local action, dealing with trespass and commandeering of a personal
residence, was a question left up to courts of Canada. See id. at 1144-45.
169. McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241, 248 (1843), superseded by statute, Judicial
Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. 10 1-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
170. Id. (citing Rafael v. Verelst, 2 W. Black 1055).
171. Id. at 247-48. The use of the term sovereignty was important during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries because it contemplated the major European powers' colonial possessions.
Today, the application of the term is fittingly applied to federally recognized Indian tribes that
are classed "domestic dependent nations" and have rights and privileges similar to those
European powers extended to their colonies during the period of colonial rule. See generally
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins ofPlenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002)
(discussing the ways in which tribal sovereignty is similar to that extended to enclaves,
territories, and other American possessions).
172. British S. Afr. Co. v. Companhia De Mocambique, [1893] A.C. 602, 623-24.
173. Id. at 624.
174. Id. at 623.
No. 2] 557
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
insufficient, and dismissed the case.' Lord Halsbury added that deference to
local courts is necessary for questions that arise that directly involve the land.176
These cases stand for the proposition that an individual who trespasses on
land under the jurisdiction of one sovereign has no legitimate expectation that
another sovereign will have jurisdiction over the trespass. 7 For example, a
citizen of Maine who trespasses on personal property in West Virginia
presumably has no expectation that the case will be adjudicated in Maine or
under Maine's laws. English cases holding that English courts lack jurisdiction
over trespass claims in English colonies further strengthen the argument that the
common law reserves exclusively to tribal courts civil jurisdiction for trespass
to real property. 7 1
Mother England is to Colony Canada what the United States is to the 565
federally recognized Indian tribes. ' While the Supreme Court has determined
that tribes are "domestic dependent nations,"'" in principle and in practice this
status favorably compares with the status of colonies or commonwealths during
the height of the British Empire. During British imperialism, English colonies
were wards of the colonizing superpower with limited self-government and
sovereignty stemming from their status as nations within the British Empire.'8 '
An English citizen committing a trespass in Canada is denied adjudication in
England because only the Canadian colony has proper venue.' South Africa
is subject to English law, but jurisdiction for a crime committed involving real
property located in South Africa rests in South Africa due to the local nature of
the action.'83
175. See id. at 630; DeLashmutt v. Teetor, 169 S.W. 34, 38 (Mo. 1914).
176. British S. Aft. Co., [1893] A.C. at 631.
177. See id. at 624; DeLashmutt, 169 S.W. at 38.
178. While English cases may not be binding authority against the courts of the United
States, they are certainly persuasive authority in determining the common law. Livingston v.
Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 600, 664 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (noting that the decisions of British and
Colonial courts "are entitled to that respect which is due to the opinions of wise men, who have
maturely studied the subject they decide"). Because the local/transitory distinction - and the
rules of the British courts dealing with its application to colonies - do not run counter to the
decisions made by the courts of the United States, nor its law, they are very persuasive authority
when it comes to determining the common law of the United States.
179. 75 Fed. Reg. 60,810 (Oct. 1, 2010); 75 Fed. Reg. 66,124 (Oct. 27, 2010) (adding the
Shinnecock Indian Nation to the list of federally recognized tribes, bringing the total number
to 565).
180. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 10 (1831).
181. Ronald J. Daniels et al., The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and
Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 137 (2011).
182. Doulson v. Matthews, [1792] 4 Eng. Rep. 1143, (P.C.) [1144].
183. Companhia de Mocabique v. British South Africa Company, [1892] 1 A.C. 358 (Q.D.)
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There is a clear parallel: a non-Indian who trespasses in Indian Country must
expect that the laws and courts of the sovereign tribe are the only place where
jurisdiction properly rests for a local trespass. States and the federal
government may have an interest in regulating or adjudicating other activities
within the reservation. But when the activity concerns the land itself, only the
tribal court can appropriately assert jurisdiction.
This argument is subject to a few logical limits. If a tribe does not have a
functioning tribal court,' then venue should rest in the federal court with
jurisdiction over the tribe for all trespass claims that arise within the
reservation. Any tribe with a functioning court system, however, should be
entitled to the deference that English courts show their colonies. Where tribal
courts exist, other courts should defer to their jurisdiction. The tribal courts
know the land better than "foreign" courts and are responsible for maintaining
order on the reservation.
C. Congressional Intent Supports Exclusive Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction
Congress has long regulated the internal workings of tribes.' The Supreme
Court has ratified this exercise, recognizing that Congress has "plenary and
exclusive"' authority over Indian affairs, stemming from the Indian Commerce
Clause."'
[362].
184. This is hardly ever a problem. Tribes too small to have a functioning court of their own
often pool their resources with other tribes to create a regional tribal court system. See
Northwest Inter-Tribal Court System, NICS, http://www.nics.ws (last visited Mar. 25, 2011);
Inter-Tribal Court ofSouthern California, ICSC,http://www.icsc.us/Welcome.html (lastvisited
Mar. 25, 2011). Other tribes have no reservation land over which to exert jurisdiction. An
Indian tribe is a political entity, and as such, exists even if it does not hold title to land or have
land held in trust by the United States on its behalf. See generally Frank W. Porter III, In
Search ofRecognition: Federal Indian Policy and the Landless Tribes of Western Washington,
14 AM. INDIAN Q. 113 (1990). For these tribes, it is unfortunately impossible to commit a
trespass to real property that their court systems would need to adjudicate.
185. The Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), upheld the
constitutionality of the Indian Major Crimes Act of 1885, the first statute directly to regulate
the internal affairs of tribes by permitting the federal government to prosecute Indians for
certain crimes committed within Indian Country. Id. at 385. While states are often denied the
ability to regulate federally recognized tribes by both the Court and Congress, the Supreme
Court long has held that Congress retains plenary power over Indians. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
186. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Washington v. Confederated Bands
& Tribes of the Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470 (1979).
187. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). For further
discussion of the Indian Commerce Clause, see Robert G. Natelson, The Original
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Neither Congress nor the Court has ever limited the power of tribal courts to
prosecute any individual, regardless of Indian status, for trespass. While the
Court has limited tribal courtjurisdiction over nonmembers in cases of criminal
acts,' regulation of hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee land,' injuries
sustained on a state highway,190 and for state officials exercising a warrant on
tribal land,"' it has often upheld the inherent power of tribes to assert civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians in areas where no overriding federal interest is
frustrated by that assertion.192
When Congress, under the guise of its absolute plenary power over Indian
affairs, specifically grants tribal courts jurisdiction through either affirmation
of existing tribal powers'93 or delegation of new tribal court jurisdiction,'94 the
courts are apt to defer to the elected branch.' 95 The courts show the same
deference to congressional delegations of tribal regulation over all persons
within the reservation, permitting tribes to set their own environmental
standards through the tribe-as-state provisions in federal statutes, such as the
Clean Air Act"' and Clean Water Act.19 While the common law, stemming
Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENv. U. L. REV. 201 (2007); Robert N.
Clinton, TheDormantIndian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L.REV. 1055 (1995); Nathan Speed,
Note, Examining the Interstate Commerce Clause Through the Lens of the Indian Commerce
Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 467 (2007).
188. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
189. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981).
190. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
191. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 382 (2001).
192. E.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 153-54 (1980) ("[W]e can see no overriding federal interest that would necessarily be
frustrated by tribal taxation."); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,65 (1978) ("Tribal
courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of
disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.").
For an excellent discussion of tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, see Melissa L.
Koehn, Civil Jurisdiction: The Boundaries Between Federal and Tribal Courts, 29 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 705 (1997). Melissa L. Koehn is now Professor Melissa Tatum, director of the Indigenous
Peoples Law and Policy Program at the University of Arizona.
193. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004) (reaffirming tribal court criminal
jurisdiction overnonmember Indians); United States v. Long, 324 F.3d 475,482 (7th Cir. 2003)
(reaffirming the Menominee Tribe's status as a federal Indian tribe).
194. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2006).
195. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197-200 (2004) (upholding a congressional act
passed in response to Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), that extended tribal court criminal
jurisdiction to nonmember Indians); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 553 (1975)
(upholding a congressional delegation of tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians who sell
liquor on the reservation without tribal permission).
196. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(A) (2006) ("The Administrator is authorized to
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from the situs rule, argues sufficiently well that tribal courts have subject matter
and personal civil jurisdiction over all persons committing acts of trespass
within Indian Country,"" congressional approval for such a policy eliminates
any remaining uncertainties regarding the advisability of such a bright-line rule.
1. Indian Trespassers
Congress and the courts have long recognized the right of Indian nations to
make their own laws and be governed by them.' Tribes regularly utilize their
full sovereign powers through the extension oftheir regulatory authority. Some
of the ways they exercise their autonomy over the regulation of their members
on the reservation include the modification of IRA constitutions to give tribal
councils greater authority,200 the enactment of comprehensive tribal codes that
govern both criminal and civil actions,2"' and the creation of tribal courts.202
The creation of tribal courts often includes appellate review and an expansion
of the areas subject to civil litigation.203 With the growth of tribal courts comes
questions of conflicting jurisdiction, particularly over the activities of
nonmembers within the reservations.
There is no federal statute removing tribal court civil jurisdiction over
Indians for civil trespass,2 " and such jurisdiction has never been judicially
treat Indian tribes as States under this act.").
197. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(4) (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(h) (1983).
For a discussion of civil regulatory authority granted by Congress to tribes, see Marren Sanders,
Clean Water in Indian Country: The Risks (andRewards) ofBeing Treated in the Same Manner
as a State, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 533 (2010).
198. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
199. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959); Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,335 (2008); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546
U.S. 95 (2005); Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701,
701 (2003).
200. See Kristina L. McCulley, Comment, The American Indian Probate Reform Act of
2004: The Death ofFractionation or Individual Native American Property Interests and Tribal
Customs?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REv, 401, 409 (2005-2006).
201. For examples tribal codes, see Codes, NATIVE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND LAW
DIGITIZATION PROJECT, http://thorpe.ou.edu/codes.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
202. See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Note, Towards Tribal Sovereignty and Judicial Efficiency:
Ordering the Defenses of Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies, 101
MICH. L. REV. 569, 593 (2002) (noting that the exhaustion doctrine requiring exhaustion of
tribal court remedies before allowing access to other courts "promote[s] Congress' policy of
tribal self-determination" and "facilitatels] the expertise of tribal courts").
203. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004).
204. Montana, 450 U.S. at 560-62 (noting that there is no congressional law denying tribal
courts jurisdiction over acts of trespass, but neither is there such a law confirming their
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divested. By implication, tribal courts presumably have the exclusive
jurisdiction to adjudicate tribal civil trespass actions against Indian trespassers
in Indian Country.205 Reservation land, including land held in trust for Indians,
is at the core of Indian Country, and states thus lack all jurisdiction to regulate
the conduct of Indians in Indian Country. 206 Even when Congress passed the
federal trespass statute, specifically expanding the ability of the federal
government to prosecute trespassers on the reservation,207 its application to
tribal members was significantly limited. 208 The courts have interpreted the
federal trespass statute not to apply to Indians for trespass on tribal lands,
recognizing that the inherent sovereignty of the tribe over its trust lands
prevents prosecution of an Indian by the federal government. 209
2. Non-Indian Trespassers
A tribal court, under its inherent power as a sovereign government entity, has
both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over any Indian who commits a
criminal or civil offense on the reservation. 2 10 This bright-line rule makes
finding the assertion of tribal court jurisdiction over the accused individual
Indian in cases of trespass to real property fairly simple. While the common
law provides for tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians for trespass to
real property, explicit congressional delegation in favor of tribal jurisdiction
jurisdiction); Williams, 358 U.S. at 221-22.
205. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564; Williams, 358 U.S. at 210.
206. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (noting that tribes have the
ultimate authority to regulate the activities of tribal members on the reservation); Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 197 (1975) (holding that the state could not regulate hunting and
fishing by tribal members on the reservation); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411
U.S. 164, 165 (1973) (holding that states cannot tax resources located on and derived from the
reservation); Seymour v. Superintendent ofWash. State Penitentiary, 363 U.S. 351, 359 (1962)
(holding that states do not have criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country); State v.
Jackson, 16 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. 1944) (holding that state hunting and fishing laws cannot
be enforced on an Indian in Indian Country).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (2006) (known colloquially as the federal trespass statute).
208. E.g., United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Greyfox, 727 F. Supp. 576, 578 (D. Or. 1989) (holding that, even when the tribal court
dismissed charges, the district court lacks jurisdiction to try an Indian for trespass under 18
U.S.C. § 1165, because tribal courts exerts exclusive jurisdiction over Indian conduct on Indian
trust land).
209. Jackson, 600 F.2d at 1287; Greyfox, 727 F. Supp. at 578.
210. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004) (criminal); Fisher v. Dist. Court,
424 U.S. 382, 387-88 (1976) (civil).
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already exists in some instances of trespass, 211 strengthening the argument for
a bright-line rule favoring jurisdiction in all instances.2 12
a) Federal Trespass Statute
Congress enacted a federal trespass statute, enabling the United States to
bring suit against non-Indians who trespass on tribal lands for the purpose of
hunting or fishing in contravention of tribal law.213 The Act states, in relevant
part, that "[w]hoever, without lawful authority or permission, willfully and
knowingly goes upon any .. . lands of the United States that are reserved for
Indian use, for the purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing thereon ... shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ninety days, or both."214 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the federal trespass statute as a clear
congressional expression that state jurisdiction over on-reservation trespass to
real property for purposes of hunting or fishing is explicitly prohibited,2 15 and
that the Secretary of Interior may make arrangements with tribes for the express
purpose of enforcing such laws.216
The United States twice has successfully brought suit against a non-Indian
under the federal trespass statute.21 7 In United States v. Pollmann, the District
Court ofMontana held that the word "land" in the statute was broadly construed
to include things of a permanent nature affixed to the land, such as the Flathead
River,218 and convicted Pollmann of trespass.219 In United States v. Finch, the
Ninth Circuit held that it was the intent of Congress in passing the federal
211. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1165.
212. Note, however, that even absent congressional delegation, the tribal court could have
jurisdiction over the Indian in question. A tribal court's jurisdiction is not limited by what
Congress delegates to it, but instead extends to all matters that implicate their sovereign rights,
except those which Congress has expressly abrogated. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,220-
21 (1959) ("[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the




215. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 342 n.27 (1983) ("The Tribe
clearly can exclude or expel those who violate Tribal ordinances. Trespassers may be referred
for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1165.").
216. COHEN, supra note 51, at 239 n.274.
217. United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 835 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pollmann,
364 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Mont. 1973).
218. Pollmann, 364 F. Supp. at 999. The court found the tribe's right to exclude was a basic
right stemming from its sovereignty. Id. at 1000.
219. Id. at 1004.
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trespass statute "that Indian property owners should have the same protection
as any other individual property owners," enabling a tribe properly to refuse
entry for fishing on its lands.22 0 Finch was convicted of trespass.2 2 1
It is important to note that the federal trespass statute pertains only to non-
Indians who trespass upon land reserved for Indians for the purpose of hunting,
trapping, or fishing.222 It cannot be used to fine non-Indians who enter tribal
trust land in contravention of tribal law for any other purpose. Additionally,
while the federal trespass statute empowers the U.S. Attorney to bring suit on
behalfofthe United States,223 tribal prosecutors are not extended the same right.
Moreover, the land covered is limited to land held in trust by the United States
for the benefit and use of tribes.224 It does not include other adjoining lands
owned in fee by Indians or non-Indians.
The intent of Congress in passing the federal trespass statute was to protect
tribes from the unlawful incursion of all persons onto the reservation without
the permission of the property owner. 2 5 Extrapolated to the complex land
ownership scheme that exists in Indian Country today, it is clear that tribal court
civil jurisdiction over trespass claims is in accordance with the expressed intent
of Congress. The Court needs to turn this extrapolation into black letter law by
announcing a bright-line rule in favor of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction for
trespass to real property within the reservations. Without proper enforcement
mechanisms available to the tribes, they are effectively denied one of the basic
rights of sovereignty - the right to exclude.226
220. United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 834 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds
by Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676 (1977) ("[Tlhe authority to withhold permission to enter
fishing, hunting, or trapping has been expressly conferred on the tribe by the promulgation of
18 U.S.C. § 1165, an enactment clearly within the national power.").
221. Id. at 835.
222. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (2006).
223. Unless explicitly permitted by federal law, the United States has the exclusive authority
to bring suit in federal court for violation of a federal criminal law. See Ann Woolhandler &
Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 420 (1995). The federal trespass
statute provides for federal prosecution of a criminal rather than a civil trespass. 18 U.S.C. §
1165. Accordingly, relief sought under it can only be made when a tribe successfully engages
a U.S. Attorney, or when that U.S. Attorney takes initiative on their own to bring suit.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 1165.
225. Finch, 548 F.2d at 834.
226. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 522 (1832); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 185 (1985).
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b) Specific Congressional Delegation of Civil Jurisdiction Over Non-
Indians to Tribal Courts
While the federal trespass statute permits the United States to bring
nonmembers in front of federal courts for trespasses that occur in Indian
Country for the explicit purposes of "hunting, trapping, or fishing,""' there
have only been two such actions since the law's enactment.228 Where the stakes
and damage to property are small, U.S. Attorneys often lack the time and
resources to bring civil trespass actions in federal courts,229 essentially
permitting by impunity trespass by non-Indians on the reservation. This leaves
tribes without the structural ability to defend their right to exclude.230
Congress often encourages the tribes' exercise of self-government over land
within Indian Country,' and reaffirms that the relationship between the federal
government and the Indian tribes is a government-to-government
relationship.232 Accordingly, Congress has recognized that trespassers who
illegally enter the land for purposes other than hunting, trapping, or fishing do
not always do so with noble purpose. They often pose a threat to the land
through the illegal procurement of timber or mineral resources, amounting to
virtual theft from the tribe and irreparable harm to the land itself.233 To that
end, Congress on two occasions has reaffirmed tribal court jurisdiction over
227. 18 U.S.C. § 1165.
228. See United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822,834 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pollman,
364 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Mont. 1973).
229. See Stephen D. Easton, Native American Crime Victims Deserve Justice: A Response
to Jensen and Rosenquist, 69 N.D. L.REV. 939, 958 n.105 (1993).
230. To give the federal trespass statute more teeth, it could be amended to allow tribal
attorneys, in addition to U.S. Attorneys, to bring suit in federal court under the Act. While such
an amendment would be a positive step, it is not an acceptable alternative to giving the power
to the tribes themselves. Both the backload of cases in federal court and the considerably higher
costs involved in litigating in federal court are prohibitive. Moreover, allowing only the tribal
attorneys to bring suit creates a discretionary process whereby the attorney picks and chooses
whether to bring suit on behalf of the proper owner. While an expansion of the federal trespass
statute would set a good precedent for the expansion of tribal powers generally, and would
greatly aid tribal sovereigns with a land base but without a tribal court system, it is ultimately
a second-class solution to the preferred alternative of clear, unambiguous tribal court
jurisdiction.
231. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting theAttributes ofNative Sovereignty: A New Trust
Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109,
179.
232. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006); Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978).
233. 25 U.S.C. § 3101(6) (2006).
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non-Indians for civil trespass to real property through the passage of the
National Indian Forest Resources Management Act234 and the American Indian
Agricultural Resource Management Act.235 Both statutes specifically reaffirm
a tribal court's concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over civil trespass to
real property committed by non-Indians,236 provided that the tribe notifies the
Department of the Interior of its intention to assume such jurisdiction,237 and the
tribal court complies with the due process and equal protection requirements in
the ICRA.238 Once the tribe communicates its intention to assume jurisdiction
under the statutes, the regulations mandate that "[t]he Secretary defer
prosecution of . .. trespasses to the tribe." 239
While Congress is manifestly concerned with the procedural rights afforded
to non-Indians by tribal courts,240 all tribal courts are already subject to the
ICRA.24 ' Regardless of whether the tribe specifically communicates to the
Department of the Interior its intention to prosecute non-Indians for trespass to
real property, Congress did not abrogate an existing right to try non-Indians
provided by the common law.242 It only added provisions specifically to clarify
that, within the areas of forest and agricultural resources management,
jurisdiction for trespass to real property by non-Indians properly vests in the
tribal court.
The lack of related challenges suggests that tribal court civil jurisdiction for
trespass to real property is uncontroversial. Since the enactment of the statutes,
only one challenge was brought against tribal court jurisdiction under either the
234. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120 (2006).
235. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3746 (2006).
236. 25 U.S.C. § 3106(c); 25 U.S.C. § 3713(c) ("The Bureau and other agencies of the
Federal Government shall, at the request of the tribal government, defer to tribal prosecutions
of Indian agricultural land trespass cases. Tribal court judgments regarding agricultural trespass
shall be entitled to full faith and credit in Federal and State courts.").
237. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 163.29()(1)-(2) (2011).
238. Id. § 163.29()(3).
239. 25 C.F.R. § 163.29(j)(2).
240. Congress has repeatedly discussed the civil rights of nonmembers appearing before
tribal courts. They passed legislation explicitly to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), recognizing the inherent power of tribal governments to
assert criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, even though these nonmembers would be
subject to the ICRA and not the full benefits of the Constitution's due process rights upon
appearance. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006). The Supreme Court affirmed the "Duro fix" in
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), which found that tribal court criminal jurisdiction
is proper not just against member-Indians, but against all Indians. Id. at 196.
241. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
242. 25 U.S.C. § 3713(c) (2006).
566 [Vol. 35
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol35/iss2/4
THE CASE OF TRESPASS TO REAL PROPERTY
National Indian Forest Resources Management Act or the American Indian
Agricultural Resources Management Act. In Moore v. Nelson,243 a Yurok tribal
member whose residence was on the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation was
arrested after "tribal officers found Moore's logging truck loaded with timber
and other logging equipment. . . . Moore was then cited for trespass and for
logging without a permit, in violation of' the National Indian Forest Resource
Management Act.2" "After a hearing in which Moore represented himself, the
Hoopa Valley Tribal Court entered an order imposing treble damages against
Moore in the total amount of $ 18,508.50.",245 Moore appealed the jurisdiction
and the district court dismissed. Judge Canby, writing for a unanimous panel
of the Ninth Circuit, affirmed the dismissal.246
The lack of litigation over the assumption of tribal court jurisdiction is
indicative that a more expansive rule governing questions of jurisdiction is a
natural extension of current events. Given the relatively uncontroversial nature
of the assertion of tribal court civil jurisdiction for civil trespass and with
Congress speaking unambiguously in its favor, a bright-line rule favoring tribal
court civil jurisdiction for all instances of on-reservation trespass is an effective
and efficient clarification of existing common law supported by congressional
affirmation.
c) Congressional Approval ofa Bright-Line Rule
Both common law and congressional intentjustify a rule vesting tribes with
exclusive jurisdiction over non-Indians for trespass actions within the
boundaries of the reservation.247 The federal trespass statute clearly
contemplates that state courts are an improper venue for trespasses that occur
within the reservation. 248  But the statute's limited language, permitting
prosecution only for those who trespass with the intent to hunt, trap, or fish,
clearly requires significant revision to adequately protect tribes. The first steps
in that revision occurred in the early 1990s, with Congress deferring
prosecution of non-Indians for certain trespass actions from federal district
court to tribal court.249
243. 270 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2001).
244. Id. at 790.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 792.
247. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120 (2006); 25 U.S.C. § 3713(c).
248. See 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (2006).
249. 25 U.S.C. § 3106(c); 25 U.S.C. § 3713(c).
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Congress twice has reaffirmed a tribal court's civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians for trespass to real property.250 While this reaffirmation is specific in
scope to forest and agricultural resources, the broad language used in both the
statute and its implementing regulations contemplate approval of a general
bright-line rule favoring tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in all
instances of trespass to real property. The benefit of a bright-line rule focused
on the offense rather than the status of the land is that it removes confusion over
whether tribal court jurisdiction is proper by replacing the status of the land
with the intent of the trespasser. Elliott is a perfect example of a non-Indian
trespasser slipping through the cracks. Because Elliott's fire was directed at
rescue and not hunting, fishing, trapping, or taking tribal forest or agricultural
resources, there remained an open question regarding the appropriateness of
tribal jurisdiction that resulted in four courts passing judgment on the question
of jurisdiction.251
The statutes themselves contain an express congressional preference for
tribal court jurisdiction when the tribe wants to assert it. Congress has spoken
plainly that "[t]he Bureau of Indian Affairs and other agencies of the Federal
Government shall, at the request of the tribe, defer to tribal prosecutions of
forest trespass cases."252 Of even clearer intent is the congressional decision to
extend the full faith and credit of tribal forest trespass judgments to all other
state and federal courts.253
The implementing regulations promulgated by the Department ofthe Interior
have recognized the congressional affirmation of inherent tribal court civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians, and accordingly, are careful not to discount that
tribes already have jurisdiction over non-Indians in cases of forest trespass to
real property.254 Moreover, another federal regulation states that "[n]othing
shall be construed to prohibit or in any way diminish the authority of a tribe to
prosecute individuals under its criminal or civil trespass laws where it has
jurisdiction over those individuals."255
250. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120; 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3746.
251. Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842, 844-45 (9th Cir. 2009).
The four courts ruling on the jurisdictional issue were the White Mountain Apache Tribal Court,
White Mountain Apache Appellate Court, Federal District Court of Arizona, and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. The final decision was remanded to the tribal court for a decision on
the merits, whereby Elliott will have the opportunity to appeal a second time through all
appellate bodies, not the merits decision, but the jurisdictional question.
252. 25 U.S.C. § 3106(c).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. 25 C.F.R. 163.29(j)(4) (2011).
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The legislative history of the final rule promulgation regarding tribal court
jurisdiction clearly indicates that the Interior considered and intended to
strengthen the inherent jurisdiction of tribal courts over trespass claims
occurring within the reservation.256 in response to comment 104, the Interior
altered the final regulations to reaffirm the sovereignty of tribal courts to hear
trespass claims, stating that "[t]ribal officials [responsible for prosecuting
trespass claims] would not be acting on behalf of the United States, but on
behalf of their separate jurisdiction."257 Congressional silence regarding the
appropriateness of the Interior's interpretation of the statutes, which permit
broad tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers for on-reservation trespasses,
is indicative of congressional approval for a bright-line rule covering all on-
reservation trespass to real property.
Those subject to tribal court jurisdiction after committing an act of trespass
doubtless will argue that the very nature of tribal property ownership makes
tribal court enforcement improper. Some reservations are highly fractionated
such that Indian and non-Indian lands abut one another often and without clear
notice.258 Persons who do not intend to trespass or who in good faith believe
they have permission to enter the land may contest a tribal court's jurisdiction
over both their person and the offense. This problem is precisely why a bright-
line rule in favor of tribal court civil jurisdiction over trespass to real property
is much needed. Trespass is an intentional tort,259 and as such, that one
mistakes the land for his own or wrongly believes he has permission to enter is
no defense.260 By giving the tribal court jurisdiction over trespass to all land
within the reservation, the bright-line rule would simplify the law and improve
its enforcement. While checkerboarding is a unique aspect of reservation
211land, it is conceptually no different than any two landowners, Indian or not,
owning adjoining lands without a clearly demarcated border. An individual
trespassing - even inadvertently - on these lands is still ultimately liable to the
256. General Forestry Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 52260,52257 (Oct. 5, 1995) (to be codified
at 25 C.F.R. pt. 163.29) (response to comment 104).
257. Id.
258. For a discussion of the history that caused Indian land fractionation and an explanation
for why it occurs on some reservations and not others, see Royster, supra note 86.
259. For a complete discussion of the intentional nature of a civil trespass claim, see supra
Part IV.A.
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
261. Allotment resulted in allotted reservations having Indian and non-Indian parcels of land
spaced in an alternating pattern that both scholars and courts now commonly refer to as
checkerboarding. While checkerboarding may confuse land ownership, it should not prevent
the standard application ofjurisdictional rules. For a discussion of checkerboarding of land as
it relates to jurisdiction, see Royster, supra note 86.
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landowner for trespass in tribal court.
For those tribes subject to diminishment,262 or where the reservation is oddly
shaped or fairly small, 263 the bright-line rule in favor of tribal jurisdiction might
be more difficult to enforce. But difficulty is no justification for rejecting the
rule. Some counties have enclaves and irregularly drawn borders. States - and
even nations - often abut one another without a clear demarcation of
boundaries. Even in these instances, ignorance of one's location is no excuse
or defense to a trespass action. By virtue of entering the land, the individual
should be deemed to have availed himself to the jurisdiction of the governing
sovereign, and thus subject to suit in tribal court.
V. States Lack Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Trespassers in Indian Country
A bright-line rule favoring tribal court civil jurisdiction over non-Indians is
not onlyjustified through common law and congressional intent, but also by the
principle that state courts are inappropriate forums to try non-Indians who
trespass in Indian Country. The Supreme Court asserts that two barriers exist
to state courts asserting jurisdiction over non-Indians for actions in Indian
Country. "First, [where] the exercise of such authority may be pre-empted by
federal law, "2' and "second, [where] it may unlawfully infringe 'on the right
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."'265 These
262. Diminishment is a judicially imposed doctrine that limits the power of a tribe over its
land when the reservation is subject to allotment. To determine whether a reservation has been
diminished, courts consider three factors: "the statutory language used to open the Indian lands,
... the historical context surrounding the passage of the surplus land Acts, and . . . the
subsequent treatment of the area in question and the pattern of settlement there." South Dakota
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 344 (1998).
263. For example, there are more than two hundred Alaska Native Villages recognized by
the Interior and subject to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C. §
1601 (2006), which permits regional and village corporations to select land to be titled in fee.
The land selected need not be contiguous, and often the portion allocated from the corporations
to the actual tribal governments is small and solely at the corporation's discretion. See, e.g.,
Kathleen Korr, Comment, A Doctrinal Traffic Jam: The Role ofFederal Preemption Analysis
in Conflicts Between State and Tribal Vehicle Codes, 74 U. CoLO. L. REv. 715, 729 n.96 (2003).
See generally Eric C. Chaffee, Business Organizations and Tribal Self-Determination: A
Critical Reexamination of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 107
(2008). Many ofNew Mexico's Pueblo and California's Rancheria's are similarly constrained,
with land bases as small as forty acres. See Caprice L. Roberts, "A Desert Grows Between Us "
- The Sovereignty Paradox at the Intersection of Tribal and Federal Courts, 65 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 347, 349 (2008).
264. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980).
265. Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
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tests are known colloquially as the tests of "pre-emption" and of
"infringement," and require a state attempting to assert itsjurisdiction in Indian
Country to demonstrate that state jurisdiction is neither preempted by federal
action nor infringes on the rights of reservation Indians.
The Supreme Court in Bracker instructs lower courts that when a state
wishes to assert regulatory authority over conduct occurring on the reservation,
the appropriate test is to balance the relevant interests.266 The state's interest in
asserting regulatory and adjudicatory authority over trespass conduct occurring
within the outer bounds of the reservation is minimal. Conversely, federal
policies promoting tribal sovereignty and self-determination are strong, and are
manifest in congressional intent.267 Accordingly, even when non-Indians
trespass on non-Indian fee land within the reservation, the state's assertion of
jurisdiction is improvident and improper, for it has been preempted by federal
policy and would "infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."268
A. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians for Trespass in Indian Country Has
Been Preempted by Federal Law
While courts have found preemption to deny states jurisdiction over the
activities of non-Indians in Indian Country most often in the instance of
taxation,269 the use of preemption is not limited only to tax cases,270 and is
perfectly appropriate here.27' The basic test for preemption originates with
266. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144-45.
267. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987).
268. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,220 (1959)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
269. See, e.g., Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980);
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren Trading Post v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
270. See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S.
877 (1986); Bracker, 448 U.S. 136. See generally Danielle Audette, American Indians and
Reimportation: In the Wake ofTribal Sovereignty and FederalPre-Emption, It's Not Just About
"Cheap Drugs ", 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 317 (2006); Laurie Reynolds, Indian Hunting and
Fishing Rights: The Role of Tribal Sovereignty and Preemption, 62 N.C. L. REV. 743 (1984).
271. The local nature of the civil offense and the paramount importance of the status of the
land make the tribal court the only judicial body with an interest sufficiently great to vest
jurisdiction. The outermost boundary of the reservation is similarly recognized by federal law
and judicial precedent as being the boundary within which the tribe has the greatest interest over
land vis-i-vis the state. See e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 47 (1831)
("[A]ny citizens of the United States, who shall settle upon any of the Cherokee lands, shall
forfeit the protection of the United States; and the Cherokees may punish them or not as they
shall please.").
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Williams v. Lee's clear determination that "absent governing Acts of Congress,
the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."2 72 Courts
have concluded that there are two basic barriers to asserting state authority over
trespass actions on the reservation, and the first of those is where a federal
scheme preempts the interest of the state in imposing its jurisdiction over the
proposed offense.273
The standard for federal preemption is less stringent in the area of Indian law
than the general doctrine, requiring only an intention to preempt rather than an
explicit congressional statement of preemption.274 The Court bases its
preference for finding congressional intent rather than express congressional
pronouncement on of the unique nature of tribal sovereignty.275
In the case of state jurisdiction over non-Indians for on-reservation trespass
to real property, there is more than mere congressional intent to preempt state
prosecution; there is an express congressional statement. 276 The federal trespass
statute, the National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, and the
American Indian Agricultural Resources Management Act each explicitly
provide congressional direction for the acquisition of tribal court civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians for civil trespass prosecution.277 Together, they
adequately represent a congressional expression of preemption, and that
Congress intends that state courts lack jurisdiction over non-Indians for civil
trespass prosecution.
B. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians for Trespass in Indian Country
Unlawfully Infringes on the Right of Reservation Indians to Make Their Own
Laws and Be Governed by Them
Even if state authority is not preempted by the intent of Congress, the state
can still be denied jurisdiction if statejurisdiction would interfere with the right
of Indian tribes "to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 278 Because
sovereignty is inherently related to the land over which the sovereign can
272. Williams v. Lee, 258 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
273. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142.
274. Id at 143.
275. Id.; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,60 (1978); Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
276. State ex. rel Nepstad v. Danielson, 427 P.2d 689, 691-92 (Mont. 1967); see also 25
U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3746 (2006).
277. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (2006), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3746.
278. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
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extend its authority and jurisdiction,279 trespass to real property is one of the
strongest and most sacred areas of tribal court jurisdiction. Removing the
authority of tribal courts to hear cases against anyone who trespasses on land
in Indian Country undercuts the sovereignty that the Supreme Court has
recognized in Bracker,280 Wold Engineering,2 8' and McClanahan,28 2 among
others, as being extended by Congress to tribal courts and governments.
A state's assertion of jurisdiction over an on-reservation civil trespass is a
claim forjurisdiction where the state's interest is weakest and the tribe's interest
is strongest. Because of the comparative importance of land, the local nature
of a trespass claim, and the necessity of a tribe to control what goes on in
relation to the land within its borders to promote tribal interests, the tribe's
regulatory and adjudicatory authority to make its own laws and enforce them
is clearly implicated. As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Rice v. Olson,283
"[t]he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply
rooted in the Nation's history."28' Accordingly, a state's interest must be clearly
articulated and overwhelming to justify a reversal of the policy favoring tribal
215sovereignty.
VI. Conclusion
The federal government is not ready to create a blanket rule vesting
jurisdiction over non-Indians in tribal courts for all civil offenses. But given the
amount of resources and time the federal courts spend reviewing tribal court
civil jurisdiction, new rules that clearly vest exclusive jurisdiction in the tribal
courts represent a step toward fully effectuating tribal sovereignty, conserving
the time and resources of federal and tribal courts, and speeding up the process
of arriving at final decisions.
Trespass is perhaps the most practical of the civil offenses over which to
grant exclusivejurisdiction to tribal courts. And because it deals with the status
of land itself, it is also the most important. The case law is clear that for both
Indian and non-Indian defendants committing on-reservation acts of trespass,
tribal courts have personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Congress has
279. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151.
280. Id.
281. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877,
885 (1986).
282. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,181 (1973).
283. 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
284. Id. at 789.
285. See Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143-45.
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already opened the door by reaffirming tribal and federal jurisdiction -
exclusive of the states - for on-reservation trespasses and by giving its explicit
approval to defer to tribal court jurisdiction for trespasses occurring within
Indian Country that involve certain classes of resources. Announcing a bright-
line rule officially vesting exclusive jurisdiction over all on-reservation civil
trespass actions in tribal courts is the next logical affirmation of the sovereignty
of tribal courts.
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